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Abstract The market design (MD) approach to institutional analysis provides the
analytical tools to evaluate endogenous institution building in local market places
irrespective of the institutional setting of the national economy. Implicit in this
analysis of endogenous institution building at the market place level is the
recognition of institutional diversity, which none of the conventional forms of
institutional analysis can provide. We extend the MD approach from its original
game theory perspective to examine three market places in China: township and
village enterprises, equity joint ventures, and public utilities. We conclude that the
MD approach (1) provides the analytical tools and criteria to evaluate whether or not
market places are robust and sustainable, (2) links market behavior at the market
place level, which is characterized by size, coordination, and trust problems, with
general level considerations based on transaction costs, and (3) suggests that
functioning market places are achievable, even if the formal institutions of the
general economy are weak or partially missing. Our research has policy implications
and opens new avenues for research into the emergence of markets.
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The purpose of this paper is to apply market design (MD) as a “new” approach that
focuses on localized institution building through examining the interaction between
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players within specific market places and identifying the conditions which sustain
these market places independently from the general “rules of the game” of the larger
economy. Our research questions address endogenous institution building: How are
actors mobilized and sustained? Which endogenous institutions emerge from their
interaction within local market places? As MD is rather new and as yet untested in
management science, we will start by providing a short introduction to the approach
of MD and by positioning it within the existing literature. We will then use three
examples from China to evaluate the usefulness of this approach. We have chosen
China because of the highly experimental nature of its economic reforms and
because of its practice of testing institutional innovation within localized market
places. In the final discussion we will elaborate on the extent to which the MD
approach contributes to management science and in particular the institution-based
view of the firm.
Markets differ widely with regard to the ways in which the general principles
underlying market economies are realized. Comparative analysis has convinc-
ingly shown that similar principles, such as private property rights, rule of law,
and flexible prices, can result in market economies as dissimilar as those of the
United States and South Korea. Emerging market economies provide even more
evidence that similar principles do not ensure similar market development
(Whitley, 1999). Carney, Gedajlovic, and Yang’s (2009) paper on the “varieties of
Asian capitalism” (see also Redding & Witt, 2009) shows that the diversity of
economic systems in Asia reflects the “creativity” of firms, investors, and political
agents in organizing business interactions through informal structures that operate
in a localized way. In other words, there is not only diversity in markets at a
national level, but also further diversity within those markets at a local, “market
place” level. Within any given country the co-existence of functioning and ill-
functioning local market places, either within the same sector but in different
jurisdictions, or within the same jurisdiction but in different sectors, exposes the
limits of any research which relies solely on an analysis of the overarching
framework governing markets at a national level.
Markets also differ in regard to the organization of individual private
exchange—the interactions that dictate how well they function. Williamson
(1985) explains that the governance structure of a market can take any form
between “hierarchy” (i.e., coordination by compliance) and “market” (i.e., the price
mechanism). In this tradition the general claim that “institutions matter” becomes
the empirical question “what is the requirement for the emergence, expansion, and
stability of markets?” (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; see also Aoki, 2007).
This change in perspective, from overarching institutions to local market places,
results in a new understanding of markets, as the expansion and stability of these
market places depend on the individual decisions of numerous participants, rather
than on the overarching institutions governing them at a national level. This raises
new questions: What makes participation in a particular market place an attractive
course of action for firms? Who is involved in creating and changing the rules
governing interaction within a market place? How is the expansion of organized
private exchange ensured or, alternatively, what hinders market places from
developing? What determines the size and stability of larger markets (Aoki, 2001;
Axelrod, 1984; Dixit, 2004)?
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Answering these questions is not merely an academic exercise that contributes detail
to the institution-based view of the players within a market. The behavior and
performance of individual firms depend inter alia on the kind of markets in which they
operate (Williamson, 1991). Functioning markets offer incentives for firms to enter.
Firms operating in functioning markets have incentives to contribute to improving the
rules which govern the interactions within their markets. This does not mean that the
formal institutional framework can be disregarded by market players. Institution
building in individual market places may help to entrench formal institutions into the
daily operations of firms, but there is also evidence showing that formal institutions
are under-used in favor of informal ones (Nee, 1989, 2000; Nee & Opper, 2010). By
virtue of its focus on its local market place, the perspective of a firm (or more
generally: a market player) necessarily privileges informal over formal institutions.
Because firms contribute to both diversity and change, an understanding of the
specific nature of the interaction processes that underlie a market place is vital for
designing the organizational structure, strategic behavior, and type of investment best
suited to that market place.
Local differences within markets have obvious consequences for international
business and management research (Bhagat, McDevitt & McDevitt, 2010). Rather
than regarding formal institutions as given and informal institutions as supplemen-
tary correctives, we propose a more dynamic view of institutions which assumes that
firms will interact with other players and will consider their strategies in the context
of the local market place. The consequence of this view for corporate and managerial
strategy is that firms entering into a particular market will have to be prepared to
consider multiple local strategies within a single national market. For managers this
means that, in addition to their commitment to formal institutions (Peng, 2003; Zhou
& Peng, 2010; see also Baron, 1995), they will also have to pay attention to local
institutions that develop as a result of their interaction with local partners.
MD originates from theoretical experiments based in computer simulations that are
aimed at achieving market clearance in individual markets—that is, in achieving
interactions between players that result in a functioningmarket capable of both attracting
and retaining players. By focusing on market clearance, MD proceeds from a study of
interaction and not from defined players: interaction creates or mobilizes the players
required to sustain it. The general intention of MD is therefore to formulate the factors
that enable market clearance within a defined market place. We propose to extend this
approach to the institutional analysis of local market places or, more generally, to the
analysis of endogenous institution building at a local level.
What is market design?
MD developed as a response to requests from companies and industry-specific
regulatory agencies looking for a better way to organize “auctions” or, as in the best
known example, a better way to allocate internships for medical students (overview
in Kittsteiner & Ockenfels, 2006; Roth, 2007). MD in its original form applies game
theory and computer simulation to interpret empirical data with a view to
restructuring impeded private exchange into functioning market places. Provided
there is sufficient data, MD proceeds by testing the systematic character of features
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identified through game theory iterations through repeated experiments. Experiments
using computer simulation first assume standard economic behavior (i.e., rational-
ity). If this assumption does not offer satisfactory results, the simulation proceeds to
search for “effects” (i.e., non-standard economic behavior provided by experimental
economics or organizational psychology) (Maskin, 2008). Ultimately, MD analysis
aims to improve interaction in market places where “market failure” is diagnosed.
For MD, a functioning market is achieved when “market clearance” occurs, in that
each market player (such as a firm) has matching business partners and no incentive
to search for better partners or opt for a different organizational/coordination
mechanism (Kittsteiner & Ockenfels, 2006).
In its practical application MD prescribes institutional configurations which are
able to sustain functioning market places. Its reliance on empirical data and disregard
for established market institutions does not mean that the MD perspective is not
based on theory. By insisting that the strategic behavior of firms and their
performance in a market place depend on micro-level institutions that evolve from
the interaction of firms with other market players, the MD perspective is well-
grounded in institutional economics and the institution-based view of the firm. By
way of summarizing empirical studies and identifying systematic factors enabling
discrimination between functioning and ill-functioning markets, MD moves to a
broader research agenda and more general results. It has formulated three require-
ments for functioning markets: institutional devices agreed upon in one market place
must, at a minimum, be able to motivate a sufficient number of players
(“thickness”); they must provide safe participation and interaction for these players;
and they must achieve market clearance. We propose to apply this approach to the
institutional analysis of local market places, or, more generally to the analysis of
endogenous institution building (Figure 1).
Positioning market design in the literature
With its focus on interaction and its functional definition of market players, the MD
perspective adds new insights to the dominant approaches for explaining
institutional diversity and change in China (Keister, 2009), such as the sociological
power conversion approach (Nee, 1989, 2000; Walder, 2003), the comparative
business system approach (Carney et al., 2009), and the institution-based view of the
firm (Peng et al., 2009).
Are the requirements for functioning markets fulfilled
yes no
Input from economics, organization theory, experimental
economics tested with game theory and computer simulation
MD Design
Empirical 
Observation
Theorizing
Figure 1 MD research
trajectory
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The power conversion approach argues that members of the former socialist
political and administrative nomenclatura play a major role in creating diversity and
change, through the separation of political leadership (initiating institutions) and
bureaucracy (implementing institutional constraints and change), and their retention
of control over assets. While this political analysis is useful for cross-country
comparison, it fails to explain differences in the behavior of the political leadership
or bureaucracies within one country. In China, for example, we find that in some
localities the political leadership and bureaucracy succeed in retaining control over
the assets and cash flow of firms, while in other localities they encourage private
exchange and even embark on complementary infrastructural investment and asset
protection. There is therefore a need to disaggregate the state (as stressed already in
the in the Grabbing Hand versus Helping Hand controversy—Frye 2002; Frye &
Shleifer, 1997). This has been done through studies that analyze the influence of the
communist party on corporate governance of stock-listed companies (Opper, Wong,
& Hu, 2002), central-local fiscal relations (Wong & Chai, 2000), and the emergence
of patronage systems between local government agencies and local firms (Walder,
1995). While these studies point to institutional weaknesses and severe agency
problems of the central state (Hendrischke, 2007; Krug & Polos, 2004), they yield
few positive results in terms of explaining elite behavior beyond arbitrary self
interest (Nee, 2000).
From the MD perspective these political issues are examples of competing
institutions leading to fiscal federalism and local autonomy through the decentralization
of decision-making power and the transfer of resources to local administrative units.
From this perspective, diversity of markets reflects decentralization rather than agency
problems (Qian & Weingast, 1997; Weingast, 1995). The MD perspective draws
attention to how the decentralized local market places generate coordination
mechanisms. The best-known example of such crucial localized institution building
is taxation, where local administrative units negotiate the total amount of revenue to be
collected on behalf of the national tax office, or agree on a sharing ratio in so-called
tax contracts.
The MD approach is less concerned with a general notion of effective government
than with the institutional capacity of political and administrative agencies in structuring
specific markets. MD argues that, as elements of endogenous institutional change, firms
come to terms with bureaucratic control, patronage, or an “arm’s-length” state, and they
do so to different degrees across industries and localities, and even to differing degrees
within one locality or industry. MD suggests that the political leadership or
bureaucracies have to be seen not only as regulators but as active market players,
whose influence is defined by their interaction in the market. Ultimately the influence of
the political leadership and bureaucracies is limited by the “economic power” of firms,
including the mobility of their assets in terms of their ability to move operations to other
market places (which could be other sectors or localities). From this perspective both the
private sector and local government agencies are motivated to align the interests of all
players in search of a suitable local market design and favorable local institutions. While
the exit option granted by the mobility of the firm’s assets may constrain the “predatory”
local state, and compliance with the formal institutional frame may set benchmarks, the
fact that firms derive their comparative advantage from negotiation with local
government agencies contributes to a diversity of local market places and local business
Market design in Chinese market places 529
environments. For MD the observed iterative processes of bureaucratic coordination,
patronage, even the use of price control and social mechanisms, are part of local
institution building among market players.
The comparative business system approach to explaining differences between
market economies has proceeded from a focus on national business systems and
problems of stability, transition, and convergence to an inclusion of internal differences
in national economies, which brings it closer to the MD perspective. From analyzing
structures (Whitley, 1999), isomorphism (institutional theory—Clegg & Redding,
1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1996), or transaction costs (North, 2005;
Williamson, 1985) in the comparative business system approach, Carney and
colleagues (2009) have extended the varieties of capitalism approach to include
endogenous change in their analysis (see DiMaggio, 1988; Hall & Soskice, 2001) with
firms actively contributing to institution building. For example, in relation to China,
the varieties of capitalism approach suggests that firms organize market surrogates in
the form of business groups or networks to fill “institutional voids” (Redding & Witt,
2009) and thereby contribute to co-evolutionary processes.
The MD approach takes this analysis one step further by empirically observing
how firms fill institutional voids beyond the varieties of capitalism focus on interfirm
relations and their limited impact on institution building. The MD approach, for
example, includes political leaders and local administrations in its analysis, if these
are found to act as market players in a local market place. This enables the MD
approach to differentiate between different forms of market participation which
reflect interfirm behavior as well as effects of asset ownership or control rights by
the (local) state. The MD approach, finally, is able to specify “endogenously”
generated forms of transaction costs in form of the costs of coordinating exchange
and aligning the interests of business partners.
Concerning the institution-based view of the firm, the MD approach proposes a
specific perspective on the connection between institutions and firms (see also Peng,
2003). The conventional institution-based view regards institutions as exogenous
and gives informal institutions a supplementary and subordinate role to the
dominating formal institutions. The MD perspective draws attention to the
alternatives to formal institutions. Whether the alternatives are called informal
(Hendrischke & Krug, 2010) or are assumed as being culturally determined (Clegg
& Redding, 1990; Hamilton, 2006) is of little concern to the MD perspective.
Instead, the MD perspective observes that interaction in a specific market place can
substitute formal institutions with informal institutions in response to the demand
from market participants for more effective constraints and incentives.
In summary, the MD perspective is based on an endogenous institutional analysis
of market places. It provides the analytical tools and criteria to evaluate whether or
not market places are robust and sustainable. Implicit in this approach is recognition
and justification of institutional diversity, which none of the conventional forms of
institutional analysis can provide. The justification of diversity lies in the nature of
institution building through interaction by all market participants under specific local
conditions. At first glance, this endogenous process of building market places and
their requisite institutions seems to go against the grain of what is expected from
institutions. In contrast to the general assumption that a formal institutional framework
is necessary to implement market conformity at the localized, market place level, MD
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suggests that market conformity is achievable at the local level even under weak or
missing formal institutions. The transition from local-level market adaptation to
national-level market conformity within both expanding markets and a national
institutional framework is not within the focus of this paper but will be taken up in
the discussion.
Applying market design to the Chinese markets
An economic explanation and justification of institutional diversity is currently
lacking for China’s experimental economic reforms. Below we will present three
examples of how the MD perspective can produce new insights into both successes
and failures within the Chinese reform processes. The MD criteria for the emergence
of well-functioning markets translate into three questions: (1) How can a sufficient
number of economic players, who are willing and able to interact in a market place,
be mobilized to become market players (the requirement of “thick” markets)? (2)
How can sufficient trust be generated among all market players to sustain their
participation (the requirement of safe participation)? (3) How can market participants
be matched to ensure market clearing at explicit or implicit relative prices, and what
coordination mechanism is needed to let demand meet supply (the requirement of
effective coordination)?
Based on these three requirements for functioning markets (thickness, safe market
participation, and market clearance) we will first turn to a functioning market as a
starting point for inquiring how market players meet these requirements. The
example of township and village enterprises (TVEs) below shows that a combination
of MD considerations and the institution-based view of the firm offers an insightful
interpretation. We then turn to two markets known for their ill-functioning: the
market for equity joint ventures (EJV) and the Chinese market for public utilities.
We chose these examples to illustrate two different causes for ill-functioning: while
both cases show that one or more of the MD requirements were not met, the
underlying dynamics differ. In the case of EJVs, a combination of insights into non-
standard economic behavior from experimental economics and institutional analysis
allows identification of a time coordination failure. The example of the public
utilities market shows that a combination of the power conversion approach (see
above) with institutional analysis points to a coordination failure within the state
administrative hierarchy. Both cases draw attention to the shortcomings of standard
approaches, which emphasize politically-initiated formal market institutions and fail
to include government agencies as market players in their analysis (shortcomings
also observed by Peng et al., 2009). We hope these examples will encourage further
research into China’s dynamic institutional setting as a natural experiment site where
well-functioning and ill-functioning markets co-exist.
The emergence of functioning markets
The start of China’s transformation from a socialist economy to a market economy,
led by local market places, was not a foreseen development of Chinese economic
reforms (World Bank, 1995). One of the most surprising features of this
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transformation was the emergence of local firms under “collective ownership” which
were able to initiate and thrive under market competition (Huang, 1990; Jiang &
Hall, 1996; Kung, 1993; Li, 2005). The overall economic performance of these so-
called TVEs, and of private entrepreneurship in the 1980s, was strong enough for
them to become the engine of growth in the 1990s and the major source for tax
revenue and export earnings in the following decade. This led to the rapid expansion
of a private sector characterized by a competitive market.
This development seems to contradict the tenet of conventional institutional
theory (inspired by North, 2005), that private property rights and the rule of law are
prerequisites for market economies. We will show that empirical data point to
deficiencies in institutional concepts while supporting the need for institutional
analysis.
In transition economies the emergence of markets starts with the re-emergence of
private exchange. While private exchange is a universal phenomenon which is hard
to suppress and is compatible with all economic regimes, the emergence of markets
is not. In formerly socialist economies private exchange, in particular firm-to-firm
business interaction, is burdened with a liability of newness which needs to be
mitigated by legitimation (Grabher & Stark, 1997; Milgrom, North, & Weingast,
1990) in order for individuals and firms to become empowered as economic actors.
Only then are they able to overcome their subordinate status of implementing state
regulation or quota. In contrast to other transition economies, the empowerment of
China’s firms was not dependent on private property rights. Instead Chinese reforms
started with a “gift” in the form of a widespread transfer of decision-making rights
(and control) to local government agencies and from them to firms and individuals.
Decentralization of administrative decision-making power within the state apparatus
established a form of fiscal federalism (Qian & Weingast, 1997; Weingast, 1995)
which included discretionary power for local government agencies to control assets,
including land use rights, combined with de facto rights to levy local taxes and local
fees. The resulting jurisdictional tax competition introduced variations in local
markets and impacted on the decisions of local firms in choosing where to expand
their business. At the same time, the break-up of existing state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and decentralization of managerial decision-making powers, including the
right to allocate resources, where and when to invest, and the right to claim residual
profit (Hansman, 1996), turned existing managers into entrepreneurs and participants
in a new market place. From an MD perspective, we can argue that the
decentralization of decision-making rights and widespread transfer of the control
of rights to individuals, firms, and local government agencies ensured the
“thickness” of the new market place in terms of its opportunities for private
exchange. In short, decentralization of decision-making rights to individuals, firms,
and local government agencies form the first building block by which the three
market requirements are met.
The decision of economic agents to take opportunities depends on whether there
is safe participation in the market. One aspect of safe market participation refers to
legitimation, which relies on social and political acknowledgement (Cucco, 2008;
Goodman, 2008) and acceptance, if not legal protection, of private exchange, private
investment, and entrepreneurship. Under the condition of unsafe market participation
market players forego innovation, or refrain from revealing their true preferences and
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disclosing valuable information about business opportunities; economic exchange
gets stuck in short-term and arbitrage dealings.
While guanxi, the personal relationship-based trust attributed to Chinese culture,
does not survive empirical scrutiny (Clegg & Redding, 1990; best critique in
Goodman, 2007), more generic approaches have shown that trust depends on
repeated interaction (Axelrod, 1984) and participation (Bohnet, 2006). Further, trust
evolves, but also relies on rational decision-making, for example, when exchange
partners agree on specific dispute settlement schemes (Güth & Ockenfels, 2003).
Trust can also be provided by social groups or guilds (Coleman, 1990; Greif, 1989;
Hendrischke, 2007) and can be generated within a social frame (Greif, 1997) or via
institutions and organizations (Nooteboom, 1996). Safe participation is not
guaranteed by culturally driven trust.
The Chinese answer to the need for trust, legitimation, and ultimately safe market
participation was to politically embed private exchange and investment. This
constitutes our second building block for securing functioning market places. TVEs
were an example of the predominance of locally-based political embeddedness over
and above resource and industry-specific embeddedness. TVEs were not local state
firms, but included an increasing number of private firms or mixed-ownership firms
with a solid base of private investment. The sharing of collective and later registered
ownership rights was their most prominent feature. By initially allocating ownership
shares to local government agencies, incentives were created to protect assets and
contracts, share political and market knowledge, and secure a favorable mix of
taxation and regulation. Moreover, while the conventional analysis quite rightly
stresses the transaction cost advantage of this type of firm (Krug & Hendrischke,
2008), the MD perspective draws attention to the dynamic and iterative interaction
that this form of embeddedness generates. With an increasing number of firms and
private exchanges successfully operating in the new market places, and with
increasing cases of “honest” and credible interactions, market participation became
attractive for more cautious economic players.
Political embeddedness turns local government agencies into market players, as
they are directly involved in market transactions, instead of only being the
representatives and executors of formal institutions. In this environment of weak
formal institutions the dominant coordination mechanism between market players
are negotiations, which are the third building block for meeting market requirements.
Negotiations can be an effective device for coordinating interaction in a market
place. The combination of decentralization, political embeddedness, and the
negotiation or exit options in the new market place turns the coordination challenge
into a restricted non-cooperative game (Zhu & Krug, 2007).
In this game, the business community and local government agencies, as the two
dominant controllers of resources, share an interest in maintaining and increasing the
value of local resources, from which they both profit. Each party has an incentive to
increase the individually appropriable share of overall outcome. This can be done by
(re-)investing in the local resource base and/or by unilaterally increasing the
individual share to the detriment of the other partner. In this game, local state
agencies expand their share of overall returns by raising taxes while firms play a role
depending on their ability and willingness to threaten to leave a locality (exit) or to
object through renewed negotiations (voice). Thus, both state agencies and firms
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have an incentive to settle for a solution, that is, to share local net returns in such a
way that no partner can change strategy without hurting total outcome (known as the
“equilibrium solution,” see Greif, 1997; Zhu & Krug, 2007). This game can be
interpreted as an implicit contract which gives local firms operational autonomy and
profit in return for workplace generation, tax revenue, and a broadening of the tax
base. There is also an implicit contract about joint investment (and cost sharing) in
the local resource base that goes beyond mere road building or communication. It
includes innovation when private investment in R&D is accompanied by access to
state-controlled research and is subject to tax breaks and other subsidies.
From the MD perspective, the emergence of a functioning market for TVEs was
the outcome of collaboration between the local political leadership and firms. By
offering both players incentives to join the market, by politically embedding new
market-conforming firms at the local level, and by coordinating resources via
ongoing negotiations, the disadvantages of missing private property rights and lack
of contractual security were mitigated. However, the outcome was not a static
equilibrium. In the 1980s TVEs were the organizational type that best fitted the
Chinese market, while in the 1990s a change towards diversified ownership
structures saw incorporated firms gradually take over what has now become a
small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) market. This organizational change
points to the flexibility of localized institution building.
In summary, political embeddedness, decentralization of decision-making power,
and ongoing negotiations were the three building blocks for the emergence and
development of a functioning market for TVEs as they ensured thickness, safe
market participation, and effective coordination. While this conclusion contradicts
the view that private property rights, flexible prices, and competition are necessary
prerequisites for the emergence of markets, the two approaches are not necessarily
incompatible. The MD set of requirements can be interpreted as the necessary
process that precedes the emergence of price competition, of the kind analyzed by
conventional economics and management studies. Institutional incentives, not
covered in the usual analyses of intended formal institutions, were used to mobilize
market participation by generating trust and contract security by aligning the
interests of the business community and local government agencies in what can be
interpreted as a restrictive non-cooperative game.
Our next step in testing the explanatory value of the three MD criteria and the
corresponding building blocks is to analyze cases of “market failure.” For this we will first
turn to the near-collapse of the EJV market in the foreign direct investment (FDI) sector.
Coordination failure in the market for equity joint ventures
As shown in Table 1, from the late 1990s the market for EJVs (and this applies
equally to the much smaller number of cooperative joint ventures) shrank
dramatically in favor of wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. The standard explana-
tion is that EJVs were an effective device through which to save on transaction costs,
as Chinese partners would bring in valuable local market knowledge, political
information, and connections (Huang, 2003) and that the switch from joint ventures
to wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries points to better governance and effectiveness
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of formal institutions as measured by international rankings (Meyer, Estrin,
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).
Yet, throughout the 1990s, we observe a gradual shift in utilized FDI from EJVs
towards wholly-owned foreign enterprises (see Table 1). The acceleration of this
shift after 2001, following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, only
confirms a trend already well underway in the previous decade. We therefore argue
that, while this late rush out of EJVs is attributable to an external top-down change
in the regulatory environment, the ongoing long-term trend was entrenched in the
internal weaknesses of China’s EJV marketplace (Voigt, 2008). Information offered
by personal accounts of practitioners in China (Clissold, 2005; Walter & Howie,
2006) suggests that the way in which market players rushed into the Chinese market,
and the resulting major coordination failure, neutralized the (assumed) transaction
cost advantage of EJVs.
EJVs form a market place where local government agencies and the local
business community offer an operational base for foreign companies through a
package of real estate, infrastructure, favorable tax and regulatory regimes, plus
“tailored” supply chains inside or outside of special economic zones (Huang, 2003).
International as well as domestic firms have ample incentives to search for partners
(including local authorities) offering the best-fitting package. Yet, in the 1980s and
1990s, foreign companies “rushed in” to conclude deals before they could possibly
Table 1 China’s foreign direct investment (utilized FDI).
Total Equity Joint
Ventures
Cooperative
Ventures
Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises
Other
Billion US$ Percentage (%)
1988 3.19 61.8 24.4 7.1 6.7
1989 3.39 60.1 22.2 10.9 6.8
1990 3.49 54.1 19.3 19.6 7.0
1991 4.37 52.7 17.5 26.0 3.9
1992 11.01 55.6 19.3 22.9 2.3
1993 27.52 55.8 19.0 23.6 1.5
1994 33.77 53.1 21.1 23.8 2.0
1995 37.52 50.8 20.1 27.5 1.6
1996 41.73 49.7 19.4 30.2 0.6
1997 45.28 43.2 19.7 35.7 1.4
1998 45.46 40.4 21.4 36.2 2.0
1999 40.32 39.3 20.4 38.6 1.8
2000 40.72 35.2 16.2 47.3 1.3
2001 46.88 33.6 13.3 50.9 2.2
2002 52.74 28.4 9.6 60.2 1.8
... ....
2009 90.03 19.2 2.3 76.3 2.3
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2008).
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have known the features of specific transactions and the alternatives to these
transactions. Likewise, local government agencies searching for investors opted for
early deals. The story of the EJV capital investment market in China is one of
mismatches and premature business deals, as the number of failed joint ventures
indicates. Though underrepresented in national statistics or official company reports,
there is overwhelming anecdotal evidence describing this phenomenon (Clissold,
2005; Dickson, 2003; Walter & Howie, 2006).
This phenomenon is known as an “unraveling effect,” which in general refers to a
situation where no agreement on entry time or “trading hours” coordinates market
transactions. Market partners rush into decisions before all alternatives are known. Each
match is concluded before the market is “opened” (i.e., before the crucial features of the
product, the transaction, and the market partner are known). Subsequently, more prudent
actors who spend time assessing the quality, professionalism, or trustworthiness of
potential partners face only a “thin” market—and a high chance that they cannot find a
matching partner, with the result that there is no market clearing. This insight from the
MD perspective sheds new light on the failure of EJVs in China. While unraveling can
occur anywhere (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998; Milgrom et al.,
1990; Roth, 2007), networking in China makes the effect even more prevalent. Each
match generates hidden costs in the lock-in effect of networks, which in turn creates
costs that are seldom accounted for when the first deal is concluded. Switching to
another alternative, while not impossible, is costly, as it implies leaving the original
network (or special economic zone). In addition to the usual factors identified with
high transaction costs, such as sunk costs or scale economies in exploiting existing
supply chains, there are costs generated by the specific form of interaction. The
strength of the networks in facilitating market transaction becomes a liability when it
comes to designing competitive functioning markets.
With regard to China, MD points to a weakness of networks in solving time
coordination problems, as they prevent agreement on trading hours long enough to
screen all business alternatives. Networks may pre-empt market transactions,
requiring “intervention” in the form of an exogenous regulatory regime. In other
words a well-functioning market needs to be engineered (Maskin, 2008). It is worth
emphasizing that the MD analysis does not require state intervention. An appropriate
regulatory regime could, for example, take the form of tradition-based trading hours
as stipulated by local law, or agreed upon by “guilds” (Greif, 1997).
In summary, transaction cost analysis, which suggested that EJVs are the best
fitting organizational form for aligning the interests of foreign investors and
domestic firms in China, does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. The MD approach,
however, can explain the shrinking usage of EJVs as an institutional market failure,
pointing to the limits of network-based negotiation for solving coordination
problems and to remedial action in the form of improved coordination.
Failure to secure safe participation in the market for public utilities
China has an impressive record of state investment in transport, telecommunications,
water, and electricity which created the infrastructure (with the exception of water
supply in the late 1990s) needed to sustain high economic growth rates. Starting in
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2002, after the costs to the environment and social costs in the form of corruption
became apparent, China attempted to redesign its market for public utilities (see
several issues of Caijing Magazine July–August 2007; World Bank, 2007).
From the perspective of market players, the utilities market is chaotic and riddled
with local overcapacity, price dumping and protectionism, rent-seeking and strategic
behavior, conflicting outcomes of so-called “solutions,” national policies that are not
implemented, local policies which run counter to national legislation, the collapse of
the EJV market, and the partial withdrawal of FDI (for the best description of this,
see Laffont, 2004). Leaving aside the sector-specific technical problems, the MD
perspective directs attention to the role of contracts as a specific problem seldom
found outside China (Richter & Wellisch, 1996). Irrespective of the political regime,
government contracts are seen as an effective coordination mechanism for aligning
the interests of investors and producers with the state. Contracts in China are
ineffective where they fail to allocate enforceable decision-making rights. This
happens when the rights to decide on investment (and capacity), market entry
requirements, and purchase prices are contested by regulatory agencies. These
agencies can be those under the State Development and Planning Commission, local
government agencies in charge of “smaller project,” or non-state foreign or domestic
investors whose equity entitles them to participation in management (Clarke, 2008).
Transcending technical issues such as contractual stipulations, auditing procedures,
or scale and scope of regulation, the resulting conflicts concern the general
enforceability of contracts, specifically their effectiveness to create actual and
enforceable entitlements for producers, investors, and operators (March, Schultz, &
Zhou, 2000). Under segmented and contested administrative authority, there are
conflicts about dispute settlement procedures when investors and local producers
dismiss regulation agencies and dispute settlement regimes on the grounds that these
have no formal authority over competition policy, or when local agencies or central
ministries insist on hierarchical rules and regulations for dispute settlements but lack
local authority. To add to this, the central state regards infrastructure as part of the
“public order” notion in the Chinese constitution and insists on the prerogative to
nullify agreements ex post (see analysis in Peerenboom, 2005) through additional
“amendments” or new regulations. Finally non-state producers and potential
investors insist on court rulings in the form of arbitration or litigation.
Competition between the different regulatory regimes indicates a failure within
the state administration to negotiate coordination between all agencies involved
(World Bank, 2007). However, this diagnosis offers few solutions. In contrast, from
the MD perspective the market for public utilities is characterized as lacking safe
participation and therefore fails primarily because firms or private investors lack
access to political embeddedness (Tyler, 1990). Unlike the regular corporate
environment where firms face a structured set of government agencies, the public
utility market suffers from contested authority and competing political agents.
Settling on one contract partner exposes firms to the risk that their contracts lack
legitimacy and cannot be enforced. The long-term nature and sunk costs of
infrastructure investment compound the risk, as switching contract partners in order
to correct initial misjudgments can be close to impossible (McNeil, 1978). In other
words, the inability to politically embed contracts in the public utility markets makes
market participation an unsafe strategy and leads to insecure participation and
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subsequent underinvestment. From a MD perspective, the solution therefore lies in
decentralization combined with market incentives, and not in continued attempts at
recentralization.
This case draws attention to another insight of MD in regard to China, namely
that the under-usage of law is an institutional device and not an institutional
weakness. Aligning the interests of market players through contracting is generally
assumed to considerably lower the costs of switching partners or of adjusting terms
of business relations. From the MD perspective the cause of the ill-functioning
market for public utilities is not the weak formal legal system but the inability to
utilize political embeddedness as the standard procedure for circumventing courts or law
enforcement. Instead of ongoing negotiations with locally empowered market partners,
players in this market face ongoing, inconclusive contests about decision-making rights
and dispute settlement regimes.
Analysis
As shown in Table 2, our analysis indicates that functioning markets in China appear
when sufficient incentives and market-specific institutions are introduced to make
participation in a competitive market a promising strategy for firms. Negotiated
participation, political embeddedness, and renegotiated contracts are identified as
specific forms of interaction which ensure the fulfillment of the three requirements
for functioning local market places. Our first example, the TVEs, raises a puzzling
question. If interaction in the private sector follows the logic of a restrictive non-
cooperation game, why do not more, or all, markets in China follow the same logic?
In response to this question, the two examples of market failure serve to illustrate the
institutional obstacles in meeting the three requirements. In the case of the EJV
market, non-rational behavior, in the form of rushing into the market and accepting
the first offer of a business relationship, led to mismatches, and subsequent thinning
out of the envisaged interaction through EJVs. In this instance, the requirement of
thickness was not achieved. The example of the public utility sector illustrates a
coordination failure as investors or producers face competing government agencies
and unenforceable contracts, which does not constitute safe participation. The result
is a lack of market clearance with parallel over-investment and under-investment,
and the collapse of a market solution for this sector.
Table 2 Are the market requirements fulfilled?
Yes No case 1 No case 2
Empirical domain Township and village enterprises
(TVEs) as initial stage of a
private sector
Equity joint venture
(EJV) sector
Public utility sector
Interaction Negotiated participation Unravelling effect Unsafe participation
Political embeddedness
Renegotiated contracts
Outcome Restrictive non-cooperation game Thinning out of the market Coordination failure
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Our analysis highlights the following findings for China: markets are designed by
market players. The point to note here is that “market design” does not refer to a
consensus by which market players agree upon a supplementary set of institutions.
Instead, MD is an iterative process (i.e., a cooperation game) in which market
players react to external constraints and the expected behavior of other market
players. This finding calls for a dynamic view of market development, and a more
differentiated picture of the role formal and informal institutions play in this process.
From a MD perspective it is less important whether institutions are formal or
informal than whether they are actually employed or not.
The local state is empowered and, in collaboration with the private sector, able to
establish functioning markets. This finding makes a strong case for disaggregating
the “Chinese state”—specifically, for functionally separating political leadership
from administration and central leadership from local political leadership. Local
government agencies defy easy assumptions about their role and behavior. Modeling
local government agencies as neutral executors of stipulations formulated in the
general institutional frame disregards the evidence that there is choice within the
general institutional framework. To assume that local governments only function as
regulatory agents is to overlook the fact that they are owners of valuable local assets
with incentives to make the best use of local resources and therefore act as market
players with self-interest in achieving allocation efficiency. In short, the findings call
for a more differentiated view of the state and its scaled role in economic
development and institutional change.
Diversity in the business environment is a manufactured diversity, reflecting
different ways by which local market players respond to constraints and
opportunities to align their interests. New, and maybe China-specific, is the
observation that local state agencies are crucial for the emergence and
development of new forms of competition and, more generally, business relations
at market place level. Entrepreneurs and firms face an accommodating local
administration which, instead of insisting on compliance with national legislation,
facilitates organizational innovation at the firm level (successfully in the case of
TVEs) and the switch to new forms of business relations (unsuccessfully in the
case of EJVs). We know that diversity in markets can be based on exogenous
factors such as resources and industry-specific factors as well as demographic,
technical, or cultural factors. We find that diversity can likewise reflect collective
local institutions which have sprung up endogenously, following a localized
market logic of their own.
These findings call to mind numerous approaches in management science and
corresponding analytical tools which could be fruitfully employed to further theorize
on the outcome of the empirical analysis. Among others, the question of
homogeneity or heterogeneity within the concept of institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), social embeddedness and networking, institutional
void, transaction cost economics, and contract theory are obvious candidates for
re-examining the empirical findings by extending the “database.” The MD
perspective invites such imports of different concepts. In the following section we
will limit ourselves to discussing what the MD perspective adds to the three
dominant streams in China-specific transition studies literature. Our discussion will
clarify why we think that the MD perspective offers a fruitful addition to the power
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conversion (elite analysis) approach, comparative business systems analysis and,
most importantly from our perspective, the institution-based view of the firm.
Discussion: How does MD add to three existing perspectives?
When considering how to contribute insights from MD to the literature on power
conversion, comparative business system/varieties of capitalism, and the institution-
based view of the firm, we also query, more generally, our understanding of and our
analytical tool kit for examining economic development, institutional change, and
transition. When is an economy in transition and when has it arrived? We will start
with the three approaches noting the overlap with some of the MD findings.
The power conversion approach acknowledges choice within the set of formal
institutions. The approach identifies state agents such as the bureaucracy (e.g., Nee,
2000) and local government agencies (Li, 2005; Walder, 1995, 2003) as actors which
use their choice to pursue their particular self-interest. Implicitly it is assumed that
these interests explain the heterogeneity of the local (including sectoral) business
systems. The empirical critique from the MD perspective is that the power
conversion approach overemphasizes the negative consequences of political agents
pursuing their self-interest to the point that heterogeneity seems to indicate a
commitment or enforcement failure. We find that collaboration with the private
sector can lead to functioning markets, provided such collaboration follows the
market logic of restricted cooperation games. Our conceptual critique of these
approaches is that they fail to specify such self-interest in institutional terms. The
power conversion approach goes as far as saying that there are patron-clients
relations (Krug, Jacobs, & Belschak, 2004; Walder, 2003) or open organizational
boundaries (Nee, 2000) between state-based political agents and the economy. The
MD perspective puts the self-interest or discretionary power of these political agents
into an institutional frame by showing that local government agents, as quasi-owners
of local assets, can become market players in local market places. Once they share
interests with local firms they become partners in searching for new ways, outside
the state sector, to organize production and coordinate business relations. In other
words, political agents can and will use their discretionary power for either
maximizing returns from the local base or implement policy as allocated to them by
superior administrative bureaus. Mostly they do both, depending on the specific
opportunities and effective control from above.
The critique of the power conversion approach allows us to answer our first
research question, namely which actors are needed for endogenous institution
building. The MD perspective identifies actors as those in control of resources and
assets with an interest in exploiting (and re-investing into) the local resource base
and sufficient discretionary power to locally introduce new coordination mechanism
as drivers of institutional change.
At first sight, the “varieties in capitalism” approach, with its focus on variations
of business systems across countries, does not seem to overlap with our locally-
focused MD approach as they operate on different scales. Yet three core concepts, or
building blocks, of the variety found in the varieties of capitalism literature support
the MD perspective in explaining institutional change within and across market
places. One is the agent-driven analysis which sees firms no longer as institution
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takers but as agents which contribute to the generation of comparative advantages
(Carney et al., 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 2007). A second building block
is the notion of ongoing heterogeneity which prevails when there is a mismatch
between new institutions and existing institutions. A third is the notion of
specialization discussed by Beckert (2010). These notions are linked to our notions
of institutional fit and embeddedness.
The MD perspective offers to this line of reasoning an explanation of the
underlying process which defines institutional complementarities by arguing that
institutional complementarities, or heterogeneity, are either negotiated or the
outcome of ongoing experimentation. For example, how private firms fit into the
overall economic system of a socialist market economy with national legislation,
Five Years Plans, and a large state sector, has been negotiated at the local level long
before private firms were acknowledged at the national level. The point to note here
is that by acknowledging private firms, local government agencies claimed
“complementarity” and bestowed legitimacy on a new form of business.
Legitimation via local government agencies also plays a role in the other cause for
heterogeneity, namely searching for a “market” niche by techniques of organiza-
tional innovation which offer a competitive advantage, such as specializing on new
products. The challenge for the new private business sector, or for that matter all
transition economies, is to find new, market-conforming incentive and coordination
mechanisms. As these new forms become less risky and more profitable, the more
firms and other economic actors subscribe to them. Acknowledgment and protection
by local agents is crucial for mobilizing risk-averse entrepreneurs and for quickly
securing market thickness. Chances to find suitable business partners increase with
the number of market players, which in turn secure better market clearing, thereby
setting incentives for more firms and local government agencies to imitate these
procedures. This snowball effect basically explains the expansion of the private
sector in China.
The varieties in capitalism approach has changed with the emergence of
distinctive types of Asian capitalist states and transition economies (Carney et al.,
2009) and, from our perspective, new market designs. Different modes of organizing
production and coordinating economic activities outside the state sector are seen as
necessary steps toward the development of capitalist economies (Grabher & Stark,
1997). The insights of this approach, in particular its insistence on heterogeneity,
helps us to answer our second research question: what are the endogenous
institutions which emerge in markets? These are institutions which facilitate the
building up of complementary, innovative forms of production and organization
which, in turn, rely on incentives to switch to new forms and the mobilization of a
sufficient number of firms to become competitive.
The overlap between the MD perspective and the institution-based view of the
firm is not hard to see (Peng, 2003). We claim that the MD perspective enriches and
specifies core assumptions of the institution-based view best exemplified by the first
propositions of Peng and colleagues (2009: 67):
Proposition 1 Managers and firms rationally pursue their interests and make
strategic choices within the formal and informal constraints in a given institutional
framework.
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The MD perspective is able to add to this its specifications of the given institutional
framework: the given institutional framework is, foremost, the market place; and within
the market place, managers and firms take part in defining local institutions, while
making strategic choices within both formal and informal constraints of the general
institutional framework. In addition the MD perspective allows us to go beyond the
general assumption of bounded rationality when cases of non-standard economic
behavior are identified. Also, Peng and colleagues (2009: 68) suggest:
Proposition 2 While formal and informal institutions combine to govern firm
behavior, in situations where formal constraints are unclear or fail, informal
constraints will play a larger role in reducing uncertainty, providing guidance and
conferring legitimacy and rewards to managers and firms.
Here, the MD perspective adds the specification that local market institutions,
below the formal/informal divide of market institutions, will at least in part make up
for lack of clarity and uncertainty by involving firms in localized institution-building
and conferring locally acknowledged legitimacy and locally secured rewards.
This link between formal and informal institutions reveals a deeper conceptual
problem, which goes beyond existing approaches and relates to our third research
question. We will conclude by discussing this third question: How does the emerging
diversity and heterogeneity relate to existing formal and informal institutions of the
larger economy?
Conclusion
In at least three ways, MD-based analysis contributes new insights to the existing
literature, in particular to the institution-based view of the firm and related
endogenous institution building (see also Nee & Opper, 2010) and to concepts and
theories of Asia management research (Bhagat et al., 2010).
First, the MD perspective provides analytical insights into how institutions work
by identifying market-specific interactions within individual market places as the
link between institutions and firms as well as other market players. Interaction within
a market converts formal institutions into effective constraints and incentives,
provided that the constraints and incentives enable market places to function in terms
of the three criteria of thickness, safe participation, and market clearance. Where
formal institutions are not able to fulfill this role specific local institutions, rather
than unspecified informal institutions, will fill the void. Two points are important to
note here as they differentiate MD from the conventional institutional perspective.
From the MD perspective we do not deny that informal institutions may fill gaps in
the array of formal institutions, but place much more weight on the ability of local
institutions to address dysfunctional market places by securing the three criteria of
thickness, safe participation, and market clearance.
Second, the MD perspective links market behavior at the market place level,
which is characterized by size, coordination, and trust problems, with general level
considerations based on transaction costs. We can demonstrate that there are functioning
market places characterized by decentralization of economic decision-making power,
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political embeddedness, and ongoing negotiation within a national economy known to
have missing property rights and a weak formal rule of law. From the MD perspective
we argue that in such market places the national institutions do not take precedence (this
would be the industrial system argument), nor do local institutions determine the
institutional outcome (the socio-political argument). Instead by dynamically extending
the MD perspective to include expanding local market places, we postulate that a new
institutional mix will emerge endogenously and locally, in response to demand from the
market players. In expanding local markets, these players would include increasingly
higher levels of the administrative hierarchy.
Third, in contrast to the conventional assumption that formal institutions are
necessary to mobilize market conforming behavior at the local level, the MD
perspective shows that functioning markets are achievable, even if the formal
institutions are weak or partially missing. The driving force behind such
movement towards functioning markets is the motivation of firms and other
actors to search for the best-fitting market partners and a form of interaction
which ensures the best matches. Our research links the results of game
theoretical MD with the literature on transition economies and emerging markets,
which has only recently added the link between micro- and macro-level
institutional change to its research agenda. Our perspective opens a new research
trajectory by pointing to the endogenous demand for institutions and the resulting
co-evolution of markets and institutions.
This is a wide field for detailed empirical enquiry which is guided on the one
hand by a set of criteria for evaluating the sustainability of market places, and on the
other hand by a much wider focus on institutional diversity, as we do not have to call
upon limited macroeconomic models to justify and explain the existence of
heterodox market structures. Our research indicates that heterodox market
institutions can be expected to exist as long as there is endogenous demand for
them at a local level and as long as the flexible rules of economic institution building
persist as part of political systems.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge: MIT.
Aoki, M. 2007. Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes. Journal of Institutional Economics, 3
(1): 1–31.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baron, D. P. 1995. Integrated strategy: Market and non-market components. California Management
Review, 37(2): 47–65.
Bates, R. H., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J. L., & Weingast, B. R. 1998. Analytical narratives.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beckert, J. 2010. Institutional isomorphism revisited: Convergence and divergence in institutional change.
Sociological Theory, 28(2): 150–166.
Market design in Chinese market places 543
Bhagat, R. S., McDevitt, A. S., & McDevitt, I. 2010. On improving the robustness of Asian management
theories: Theoretical anchors in the era of globalization. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(2):
179–192.
Bohnet, I. 2006. How institutions affect behaviour: Insights from economics and psychology. In D. de Cremer,
M. Zeelenberg & J. K. Murnighan (Eds.). Social psychology and economics: 213–237. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Caijing Magazine (Finance and Economics). 2007. http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2009/cjindex2007/,
Accessed Jul. 7, 2010.
Carney, M., Gedaijlovic, E., & Yang, X. 2009. Varieties in Asian capitalism: Toward an institutional
theory of Asian enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 361–380.
Clarke, D. C. 2008. Legislating for a market economy in China. The China Quarterly, 191: 567–585.
Clegg, S. R., & Redding, S. G. (Eds.) 1990. Capitalism in contrasting cultures. Berlin and New York: de
Gruyter.
Clissold, T. 2005. Mr. China. New York: HarperCollins.
Coleman, J. S. 1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cucco, I. 2008. The professional middle classes: Management and politics. In D. S. G. Goodman (Ed.).
The new rich in China: 148–167. London: Routledge.
Dickson, B. J. 2003. Red capitalists in China: The party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political
change. New York: Cambridge University Press.
DiMaggio, P. J. 1988. Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.). Institutional
patterns and organizations: 3–22. Cambridge: Ballinger.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147–160.
Dixit, A. K. 2004. Lawlessness and economics: Alternative modes of governance. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Frye, T. 2002. Capture or exchange? Business lobbying in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 54(7): 1017–1036.
Frye, T., & Shleifer, A. 1997. The invisible hand and the grabbing hand. American Economic Review, 87:
354–358.
Goodman, D. S. G. 2007. Narratives of change: Culture and local economic development. In B. Krug &
H. Hendrischke (Eds.). The Chinese economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and business behaviour:
175–201. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Goodman, D. S. G. 2008. Why China has no new middle class: Cadres, managers and entrepreneurs. In
D. S. G. Goodman (Ed.). The new rich in China: 23–37. London: Routledge.
Grabher, G., & Stark, D. 1997. Organizing diversity: Evolutionary theory, network analysis and post
socialism. Regional Studies, 31(5): 533–544.
Güth, W., & Ockenfels, A. 2003. The coevolution of trust and institutions in anonymous and non-
anonymous communities. In M. J. Holler, H. Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen, & M. E. Streit (Eds.). The
political economy of institutional evolution: 157–172. Tübingen, DE: J. C. B. Mohr.
Greif, A. 1989. Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: Evidence on the Maghribi traders. Journal of
Economic History, 49: 857–882.
Greif, A. 1997. Self-enforcing political system and economic growth: Late medieval Genoa.
Working paper no. 97-037, Department of Economics, Stanford University, Palo Alto,
California; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research),
Munich, Germany.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. 2001. Varieties in capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative
advantage. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hamilton, G. G. 2006. Commerce and capitalism in Chinese societies. London: Routledge.
Hansman, H. 1996. The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge: Belknap.
Hendrischke, H. 2007. Networks as business networks. In B. Krug & H. Hendrischke (Eds.). The
Chinese economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and business behaviour: 202–222. Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar.
Hendrischke, H., & Krug, B. 2010. China’s informal sector: An institutional approach. Paper presented at
the IACMR Conference, Shanghai, June 16–19.
Huang, Y. 1990. Web of interests and patterns of behaviour of Chinese local economic bureaucracies and
enterprises during reforms. The China Quarterly, 123: 431–458.
Huang, Y. 2003. Selling China: Foreign direct investment during the reform era. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Jiang, S., & Hall, R. H. 1996. Local corporatism and rural enterprises in China’s reform. Organization
Studies, 17: 929–952.
544 B. Krug, H. Hendrischke
Keister, L. A. 2009. Organizational research on market transition: A sociological approach. Asia Pacific
Journal of Management, 26(4): 719–742.
Kittsteiner, T., & Ockenfels, A. 2006. Market design: A selective review. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft,
5: 121–143.
Krug, B., & Hendrischke, H. 2008. Framing China: Transformation and institutional change. Management
and Organization Review, 4(1): 81–108.
Krug, B., Jacobs, G., & Belschak, F. 2004. Social capital in China: The meaning of guanxi in Chinese
business. In B. Krug (Ed.). China’s rational entrepreneurs: The development of the new private
business sector: 166–188. London: Routledge.
Krug, B., & Polos, L. 2004. Emerging markets, entrepreneurship and uncertainty: The emergence of a
private sector in China. In B. Krug (Ed.). China’s rational entrepreneurs: The development of the new
private business sector: 72–96. London: Routledge.
Kung, J. K. 1993. Organizational response to monitoring and sharing problems: The choice of reformation
system in Chinese collective agriculture. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149(3):
597–590.
Laffont, J.-J. 2004. Management of public utilities in China. Annals of Economics and Finance, 5(2): 185–
210.
Li, P. P. 2005. The puzzle of China’s township-village enterprises: The paradox of local corporatism in a
dual track economic transition. Management and Organization Review, 1: 197–224.
March, J. G., Schultz, M., & Zhou, X. 2000. The dynamics of rules: Change in written organizational
rules. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Maskin, E. S. 2008. Mechanism design: How to implement social goals. American Economic Review, 98
(3): 567–576.
McNeil, I. 1978. Adjustment of long term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational
contract law. Northwestern Law Review, 72(6): 863–905.
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Peng, M. W. 2009. Institutions, resources, and entry strategies
in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30: 61–80.
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The
law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics, 2(1): 1–23.
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 2008. Statistical yearbook of the People’s
republic of China: Section 17-14. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of
China.
Nee, V. 1989. A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in state socialism. American
Sociological Review, 54: 663–681.
Nee, V. 2000. The role of the state in making a market economy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 156: 64–88.
Nee, V., & Opper, S. 2010. Endogenous institutional change and dynamic capitalism. Sociologia del
Lavoro. (forthcoming).
Nooteboom, B. 1996. Trust, opportunism and governance: A process and control model. Organization
Studies, 17: 985–1010.
North, D. C. 2005. Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Opper, S., Wong, S. M. L., & Hu, R. 2002. Party power, markets and private power: Chinese communist
party persistence in China’s listed companies. The Future of Market Transition, 19: 103–136.
Peerenboom, R. 2005. What have we learned about law and development? Describing, predicting and
assessing legal reforms in China. Michigan Journal of International Law, 27: 823–862.
Peng, M. W. 2003. Institutional transition and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 28(2):
275–296.
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. 2009. The institution-based view as a third leg for a
strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(3): 63–81.
Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. 1997. Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 11: 83–92.
Redding, G., & Witt, M. A. 2009. China’s business system and its future trajectory. Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 26(3): 381–399.
Richter, W. F., & Wellisch, D. 1996. The provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of
firm and household mobility. Journal of Public Economics, 60: 73–93.
Roth, A. E. 2007. What have we learned from market design?. NBER working paper series no. w13530,
Washington, DC.
Selznick, P. 1996. Institutionalism “old” and “new. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(2): 270–277.
Tyler, T. R. 1990. Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
Market design in Chinese market places 545
Voigt, S. 2008. Are international merchants stupid? Their choice of law casts doubt on the legal origin
theory. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 5: 1–20.
Walder, A. G. 1995. Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational analysis of China’s
transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 101: 263–301.
Walder, A. G. 2003. Elite opportunity in transitional economies. American Sociological Review, 68(6):
899–916.
Walter, C. E., & Howie, F. J. T. 2006. Privatizing China: Inside china’s stock markets. Singapore: John
Wiley & Sons.
Weingast, B. R. 1995. The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and
economic development. Journal of Law and Economic Organization, 11: 1–31.
Whitley, R. D. 1999. Divergent capitalism: The social construction and change of business systems.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whitley, R. D. 2007. Business systems and organizational capabilities: The institutional structuring of
competitive competences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets, relational contracting.
New York: Free.
Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural
alternative. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 269–296.
Wong, C. P. W., & Chai, J. C. H. 2000. Fiscal reform and local industrialization. In J. C. H. Chai (Ed.).
Reforms and opening up since 1979, vol. 3: 158–188. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
World Bank. 1995. China: Macroeconomic stability in a decentralized economy. Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
World Bank. 2007. World development indicators. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Zhou, J. Q., & Peng, M. W. 2010. Relational exchanges versus arm’s-length transactions during
institutional transitions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(3): 355–370.
Zhu, Z., & Krug, B. 2007. China’s emerging tax regime: Local tax farming and central tax bureaucracy. In
B. Krug & H. Hendrischke (Eds.). The Chinese economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and business
behaviour: 145–174. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Barbara Krug (PhD, Saarland University) is professor for economics of governance in the Rotterdam
School of Management (RSM) at Erasmus University of Rotterdam. Her most recent (edited) book is The
Chinese Economy in the 21st Century: Enterprise and Business Behaviour (2007).
Hans Hendrischke (PhD, University of Bochum) is professor of Chinese political economy in the School
of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, Australia. He is co-editor of The Chinese
Economy in the 21st Century: Enterprise and Business Behaviour (2007).
546 B. Krug, H. Hendrischke
